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Abstract
The paper [12] examines a concept of equilibrium policies instead of optimal controls
in stochastic optimization to analyze a mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We
follow the same approach in order to investigate the Merton portfolio management
problem in the context of non-exponential discounting, a context that give rise to
time-inconsistency of the decision maker. Equilibrium policies are characterized in
this context by means of a variational method which leads to a stochastic system
that consists of a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and an
equilibrium condition. An explicit representation of the equilibrium policies is provided
for the special cases of power, logarithmic and exponential utility functions.
Keys words: Stochastic Optimization, Investment-Consumption Problem, Merton Port-
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1 Introduction
Background
The common assumption in classical investment-consumption problems under discounted
utility is that the discount rate is assumed to be constant over time which leads to the dis-
count function be exponential. This assumption provides the possibility to compare outcomes
occurring at different times by discounting future utility by some constant factor. But on the
other hand, results from experimental studies contradict this assumption indicating that dis-
count rates for the near future are much lower than discount rates for the time further away
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in future. Ainslie, in [1], established experimental studies on human and animal behaviour
and found that discount functions are almost hyperbolic, that is, they decrease like a negative
power of time rather than an exponential. Loewenstein & Prelec in [18] show that economic
decision makers are impatient about choices in the short term but are more patient when
choosing between long-term alternatives, and therefore a hyperbolic type discount function
would be more realistic.
Unfortunately, as soon as discount function is non-exponential, discounted utility mod-
els become time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit the Bellman’s optimality
principle. Consequently, classical dynamic programming approach may not be applied to
solve these problems. In light of the non-applicability of dynamic programming approach
directly, there are two basic ways of handling time inconsistency in non exponential dis-
counted utility models. In the first one, under the notion of naive agents, every decision
is taken without taking into account that their preferences will change in the near future.
The agent at time t ∈ [0, T ] will solve the problem as a standard optimal control problem
with initial condition X(t) = xt. If we suppose that the naive agent at time 0 solves the
problem, his ot her solution corresponds to the so-called pre-commitment solution, in the
sense that it is optimal as long as the agent can pre-commit his or her future behavior at
time t = 0. Kydland & Prescott in [17] indeed argue that a pre-committed strategy may
be economically meaningful in certain circumstances. The second approach consists in the
formulation of a time-inconsistent decision problem as a non cooperative game between in-
carnations of the decision maker at different instants of time. Nash equilibrium of these
strategies are then considered to define the new concept of solution of the original problem.
Strotz in [26] was the first who proposed a game theoretic formulation to handle the dynamic
time inconsistent optimal decision problem on the deterministic Ramsey problem, see [25].
Then by capturing the idea of non-commitment, by letting the commitment period being
infinitesimally small, he provided a primitive notion of Nash equilibrium strategy. Further
work along this line in continuous and discrete time had been done by Pollak [24], Phelps
and Pollak [22], Goldman [11], Barro [2] and Krusell & Smith [16]. Keeping the same game
theoretic approach, Ekland & Lazrak [7] and Mar´ın-Solano & Navas [19] treated the optimal
consumption problem where the utility involves a non-exponential discount function in the
deterministic framework. They characterized the equilibrium strategies by a value function
which must satisfy a certain ”extended HJB equation”, which is a non linear differential
equation displaying a non local term, a term which depends on the global behaviour of the
solution. In this situation, every decision at time t is taken by a t−agent which represents
the incarnation of the controller at time t and is referred in [19] as a ”sophisticated t−agent”.
Bjo¨rk & Murguci in [4] extends the idea to the stochastic setting where the controlled
dynamic is driven by a quite general class of Markov process and a fairly general objec-
tive function. Yong in [27], by a discretization of time, studied a class of time inconsis-
tent deterministic linear quadratic models and derive equilibrium controls via some class
of Riccati-Voltera equations. Yong in [28], also by a discretization of time, investigated a
general discounting time inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem and characterizes a
feedback time-consistent Nash equilibrium control via the so-called ”equilibrium HJB equa-
tion”. In a series of papers, Basak & Chabakauri [3], Hu et al. [12], Czichowsky [6] and
Bjo¨rk et al. [5] look at the mean variance problem which is also time inconsistent.
Concerning equilibrium strategies for an optimal consumption-investment problem with
a general discount function, Ekeland & Pirvu [8] are the first to investigate Nash equilibrium
strategies where the price process of the risky asset is driven by geometric Brownian motion.
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They characterize the equilibrium strategies through the solutions of a flow of BSDEs, and
they show, for an special form of the discount function, that the BSDEs reduce to a system
of two ODEs which has a solution. Ekeland et al. in [9] added life insurance to the investor’s
portfolio and they characterize the equilibrium strategy by an integral equation. In [28],
Yong discussed the case of time-inconsistent consumption-investment problem under a power
utility function. Following Yong’s approach, Zhao et al. in [30] studied the consumption-
investment problem with a general discount function and a logarithmic utility function.
Recently, Zou et al. in [31] investigated equilibrium consumption-investment decisions for
Merton’s portfolio problem with stochastic hyperbolic discounting.
Novelty and Contribution
The purpose of this paper is to investigate equilibrium solutions for a time-inconsistent
consumption-investment problem with a non-exponential discount function and a general
utility function. Different from [19] and [8] where the authors derived explicit solutions for
special forms of the discount factor, in our model, the non-exponential discount function is
in a fairly general form. Moreover, we consider equilibrium strategies in the open-loop sense,
in a manner similar to [12], which is different from most of the existing literature on this
topic. Noting also that, the time-inconsistency, in our paper, arises from a non exponential
discounting in the objective function, while the works [12] and [13] are concerned with a
quite different kind of time-inconsistency which is caused by the presence of non linear term
of expectations in the terminal cost. Second, the objective functional, in our paper, is not
reduced to the quadratic form as in [12].
The approach to solving the problem is based on a variational technique leading to a
version of the stochastic maximum principle, which involves a flow of forward-backward
stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) along with a certain equilibrium condition. Then
by decoupling the flow of the FBSDEs, we derive a closed-loop representation of the equilib-
rium strategies via some parabolic non-linear partial differential equation (PDE). We show
that within a special form of the utility function (logarithmic utility, power utility, and
exponential utility) the PDE reduces to a system of ODEs which has an explicit solution.
We accentuate that, different from most of the existing literature on this topic where
some feedback equilibrium strategies are derived via several very complicated highly non-
linear integro-differential equations, an explicit representation of the equilibrium strategies
are obtained in our work via simple ODEs. In addition, this method can provide the necessary
and sufficient conditions to characterize the equilibrium strategies, while the extended HJB
techniques can create in general only the sufficient condition in the form of verification
theorem that characterizes the equilibrium strategies.
Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem and
give the necessary notations and preliminaries. In Section 3 we present the first main result
of this work (Theorem 3.2), that characterizes equilibrium decisions. In Section 4, we derive
an explicit representation of the equilibrium consumption-investment strategy. Section 5 is
devoted to some comparisons with existing results in the literature. The paper ends with an
Appendix containing some proofs.
3
2 Problem formulation
Throughout this paper, (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ,P) will be a filtered probability space such that
F0 contains all P-null sets, FT = F for an arbitrarily fixed finite time horizon T > 0 and
(Ft)t∈[0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. Recall that Ft stands for the information available up
to time t and any decision made at time t is based on this information. We also assume that
all processes and random variables are well defined and adapted to this filtered probability
space. Let W (·) = (W1 (·) , . . . ,Wd (·))
⊤ be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion
defined on (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ,P). For simplicity, it is assumed that the underlying filtration
(Ft)t∈[0,T ], coincides with the one generated by the Brownian motion.
2.1 Notations
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations: M⊤: the transpose of the vector (or
matrix) M , 〈χ, ζ〉 : the inner product of χ and ζ , that is 〈χ, ζ〉 := tr(χT ζ). For a function f,
we denote by fx (resp. fxx) the first (resp. the second) derivative of f with respect to the
variable x.
For any Euclidean space E with Frobenius norm |.| we let for any t ∈ [0, T ] ,
• Lp (Ω,Ft,P;E) : for any p ≥ 1, the set of E−valued Ft−measurable random variables
X, such that E [|X|p] <∞.
• L∞F (t, T ;E) : the space of E−valued, (Fs)s∈[t,T ]−adapted processes c (·), with
‖c (·)‖L∞
F
(t,T ;E) = E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|c (s)|
]
<∞.
• L2F (t, T ;E) : the space of E−valued, (Fs)s∈[t,T ]−adapted continuous processes Y (·),
with
‖Y (·)‖L2
F
(t,T ;E) =
√√√√E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y (s)|2
]
<∞.
• M2F (t, T ;E) : the space of E−valued, (Fs)s∈[t,T ]−adapted processes Z (·), with
‖Z (·)‖M2
F
(t,T ;E) =
√
E
[∫ T
t
|Z (s)|2 ds
]
<∞.
2.2 Financial market
Consider an individual facing the intertemporal consumption and portfolio problem where
the market environment consists of one riskless and d risky securities. The risky securities
are stocks and their prices are modelled as Itoˆ processes. Namely, for i = 1, 2, .., d, the price
Si (s) , for s ∈ [0, T ] , of the i-th risky asset satisfies
dSi (s) = Si (s)
(
µi (s) ds+
d∑
j=1
σij (s) dWj (s)
)
, (2.1)
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with Si (0) > 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., d, and the coefficients µi (·) and σi (·) = (σi1 (·) , . . . , σid (·)) ,
for i = 1, .., d, are (Ft)t∈[0,T ] -progressively measurable processes with values in R and R
d,
respectively. For brevity, we use µ (·) = (µ1 (·) , µ2 (·) , . . . , µd (·)) to denote the drift rate
vector and σ (·) = (σij (·))1≤i,j≤d to denote the random volatility matrix.
The riskless asset, or the savings account, has the price process S0 (s), for s ∈ [0, T ]
governed by
dS0 (s) = r0 (s)S0 (s) ds, S0 (0) = 1, (2.2)
where r0 (·) is a deterministic function with values in [0,∞) that represents the interest rate.
We assume that E [µi (t)] > r0 (t) ≥ 0, dt − a.e., for i = 1, 2, .., d. This is a very natural
assumption, since otherwise nobody is willing to invest in the risky stocks.
2.3 Investment-consumption policies and wealth process
Starting from an initial capital x0 > 0 at time 0, during the time horizon [0, T ], the decision
maker is allowed to dynamically investing in the stocks as well as in the bond and consuming.
A consumption-investment strategy is described by a (d+ 1)-dimensional stochastic process
u (·) = (c (·) , u1 (·) , . . . , ud (·))
⊤
, where c (s) represents the consumption rate at time s ∈
[0, T ] and ui (s) , for i = 1, 2, .., d, represents the amount invested in the i-th risky stock at
time s ∈ [0, T ] . The process uI (·) = (u1 (·) , . . . , ud (·))
⊤ is called an investment strategy.
The amount invested in the bond at time s is Xx0,u(·) (s)−
d∑
i=1
ui (s), where X
x0,u(·) (·) is the
wealth process associated with the strategy u (·) and the initial capital x0. The evolution of
Xx0,u(·) (·) can be described as dXx0,u(·) (s) =
(
Xx0,u(·) (s)−
d∑
i=1
ui (s)
)
dS0 (s)
S0 (s)
+
d∑
i=1
ui (s)
dSi (s)
Si (s)
− c (s) ds, for s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xx0,u(·) (0) = x0.
Accordingly, the wealth process solves the following SDE
dXx0,u(·) (s) =
{
r0 (s)X
x0,u(.) (s) + uI (s)
⊤
r (s)− c (s)
}
ds
+ uI (s)
⊤
σ (s) dW (s) , for s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xx0,u(·) (0) = x0.
(2.3)
where r (·) = (µ1 (·)− r0 (·) , . . . , µd (·)− r0 (·))
⊤.
As time evolves, it is natural to consider the controlled stochastic differential equation
parametrized by (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R) and satisfied by X (·) = X
t,ξ (·; u (·)) ,{
dX (s) =
{
r0 (s)X (s) + uI (s)
⊤
r (s)− c (s)
}
ds+ uI (s)
⊤
σ (s) dW (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ.
(2.4)
Definition 2.1 (Admissible Strategy). A strategy u (·) =
(
c (·) , uI (·)
⊤
)⊤
is said to be
admissible over [t, T ] if u (·) ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R) × M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
and for any (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] ×
L
2 (Ω,Ft,P;R) , the equation (2.4) has a unique solution X (·) = X
t,ξ (·; u (·)) .
We impose the following assumption about the coefficients.
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(H1) The processes r0 (.) , r (.) and σ (.) , are uniformly bounded. We also assume a uniform
ellipticity condition as follows:
σ (s)σ (s)⊤ ≥ ǫId, ds− a.e, dP−a.s.
for some ǫ > 0, where Id denotes the identity matrix on R
d×d.
Under (H1), for any (t, ξ, u (·)) ∈ [0, T ]×L2 (Ω,Ft,P;R)×L
∞
F (t, T ;R)×M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
,
the state equation (2.4) has a unique solution X (.) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R). Moreover, we have the
following estimate
E
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|X (s)|2
]
≤ K
(
1 + E
[
|ξ|2
])
, (2.5)
for some positive constant K. In particular for t = 0, x0 > 0 and u (.) =
(
c (.) , uI (.)
⊤
)⊤
∈
L∞F (0, T ;R) ×M
2
F
(
0, T ;Rd
)
, the state equation (2.3) has a unique solution Xx0,u(·) (·) ∈
L2F (0, T ;R) and the following estimate holds
E
[
sup
0≤s≤T
∣∣Xx0,u(.) (s)∣∣2] ≤ K (1 + |x0|2) . (2.6)
2.4 General discounted utility function
Most of financial-economics works have considered that the rate of time preference is constant
(exponential discounting). However there is growing evidence to suggest that this may not be
the case. In this section, we discuss the general discounting preferences. We also introduce
the basic modeling framework of Merton’s consumption and portfolio problem. We refer the
reader to [10], [14], [20], [21] and [23] for more detail about the classical Merton model.
2.4.1 Discount function
As soon as discounting is non-exponential, most papers work with special form of the non-
exponential discount factor. Different to these works we consider a general form of the
discount factor.
Definition 2.2. A discount function λ : [0, T ] → R is a deterministic function satisfying
λ (0) = 1, λ (s) > 0 ds− a.e. and
∫ T
0
λ (s) ds <∞.
We also impose the following Lipschitz condition with constant C, on λ (·)
(H2) There exists a constant C > 0 such that |λ (s)− λ (t)| ≤ C |s− t| , for any t, s ∈ [0, T ] .
Remark 2.3. Assumption (H2) is satisfied by many discount functions, such as exponential
discount functions [20], [21], mixture of exponential functions [8] and hyperbolic discount
functions [30].
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2.4.2 Utility functions and objective
In order to evaluate the performance of a consumption-investment strategy, the decision
maker derives utility from intertemporal consumption and final wealth. Let ϕ (·) be the
utility of intertemporal consumption and h (·) the utility of the terminal wealth at some
non-random horizon T (which is a primitive of the model). Then, for any (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] ×
L
2 (Ω,Ft,P;R) the investment-consumption optimization problem is reduced to maximize
the utility function J (t, ξ, .) given by
J (t, ξ, u (·)) = Et
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)ϕ (c (s)) ds+ λ (T − t)h (X (T ))
]
, (2.7)
over u (·) ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R) × M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
, subject to (2.4) , where Et [·] = E [· |Ft ]. We
restrict ourselves to utility functions which satisfy the following condition
(H3) The maps ϕ, h : R → R are strictly increasing, strictly concave twice continuously
differentiable functions and satisfy the Inada conditions. We suppose also that, there
exists a positive constant C such that
|ϕxx (x)− ϕxx (xˆ)|+ |hxx (x)− hxx (xˆ)| ≤ C |x− xˆ| , ∀x, xˆ ∈ R.
We shall denote by I(·) the (continuous, strictly decreasing) inverse of the marginal
utility function ϕx (·) .
If we write W ⋆ (s) =
(
0,W (s)⊤
)⊤
and we denote B (s) =
(
−1, r (s)⊤
)⊤
, Γ =
(
1, 0⊤
Rd
)⊤
and
D (s) =
(
0 0⊤
Rd
0Rd σ (s)
)
,
then the optimal control problem associated with (2.4) and (2.7) is equivalent to maximize
J (t, ξ, u (.)) = Et
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)ϕ
(
Γ⊤u (.)
)
ds+ λ (T − t) h (X (T ))
]
, (2.8)
subject to{
dX (s) =
{
r0 (s)X (s) + u (s)
⊤
B (s)
}
ds+ u (s)⊤D (s) dW ⋆ (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
X (t) = ξ.
(2.9)
2.4.3 Time inconsistency
Let us first note that the optimal policies, although they exist, will not be time-consistent
in general. First of all, as an illustration, let us consider the model in (2.8)–(2.9) with
logarithmic utility functions, we suppose that the financial market consists of one riskless
asset and d risky assets. Arguing as in [8], we can prove that, if the agent is naive and
starts with a given positive wealth x, at some instant t, then by the standard dynamic
programming approach, the value function associated with this stochastic control problem
7
solves the following Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation
V ts (s, x) + sup
(c,uI)∈Rd+1
{(
r0 (s)X (s) + uI
⊤r (s)− c
)
V tx (s, x) +
1
2
u⊤I σ (s) σ (s)
⊤
uIV
t
xx (s, x)
+
λ′ (s− t)
λ (s− t)
V t (s, x) + ϕ (c) = 0
}
, for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
V t (T, x) = h (x) .
(2.10)
The HJB equation contains the term
λ′ (s− t)
λ (s− t)
, which depends not only on the current
time s but also on initial time t so the optimal policy will depend on t as well. Indeed, the
first order necessary conditions yield the t−optimal policy
ut1 (s) = r (s)
(
σ (s) σ (s)⊤
)−1 V tx (s, x)
V txx (s, x)
,
ct (s) = ϕ−1
(
V tx (s, x)
)
.
Let us consider the following example: ϕ (x) = h (x) = log x. The naive agent for the
initial pair (0, x0) solves the problem, assuming that the discount rate of time preference will
be λ (s), for s ∈ [0, T ] , the optimal consumption strategy will be
c0,x0 (s) =
[
1 +
∫ T
s
exp
{
λ (r − s) + log
(
λ (r)
λ (s)
)}
dr
]−1
, for s ∈ [0, T ] .
This solution corresponds to the so-called pre-commitment solution, in the sense that
it is optimal as long as the agent can precommit (by signing a contract, for example) his
or her future behavior at time t = 0. If there is no commitment, the 0-agent will take
the action c0,x0 (s) but, in the near future, the ǫ-agent will change his decision rule (time-
inconsistency) to the solution of the HJB equation (2.10) with t = ǫ. In this cas the optimal
control trajectory for s > ǫ will be changed to cǫ,xǫ (s) given by
cǫ,xǫ (s) = cǫ,X¯(ǫ) (s) =
[
1 +
∫ T
s
exp
{
λ (r − s) + log
(
λ (r − ǫ)
λ (s− ǫ)
)}
dr
]−1
, for s ∈ [ǫ, T ] .
If λ (t) = e−δt where δ > 0 is the constant discount rate, then
c
0,x0
|[ǫ,T ] (s) = c
ǫ,xǫ (s) , for s ∈ [ǫ, T ] ,
hence the optimal consumption plan is time consistent. As soon as discount function is
non-exponential
c
0,x0
|[ǫ,T ] (s) 6= c
ǫ,xǫ (s) , for s ∈ [ǫ, T ] .
Then the optimal consumption plan is not time consistent. In general, the solution for the
naive agent will be constructed by solving the family of HJB equations (2.10) for t ∈ [0, T ],
and patching together the “optimal” solutions ct,xt (t). If the agent is sophisticated, things
become more complicated. The standard HJB equation cannot be used to construct the
solution, and a new method is required in what follows.
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3 Equilibrium strategies
It is well known that the problem described above by (2.8) − (2.9) turn out to be time
inconsistent in the sense that it does not satisfy the Bellman optimality principle, since a
restriction of an optimal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not
be optimal for that corresponding initial pair. For a more detailed discussion see Ekeland
& Pirvu [8] and Yong [28]. Since lack of time consistency, we consider open-loop Nash
equilibrium controls instead of optimal controls. As in [12], we first consider an equilibrium
by local spike variation, given for t ∈ [0, T ] , an admissible consumption-investment strategy
uˆ (.) ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R) × M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
. For any Rd+1−valued, Ft−mesurable and bounded
random variable v and for any ε > 0, define
uε (s) =
{
uˆ (s) + v, for s ∈ [t, t+ ε) ,
uˆ (s) , for s ∈ [t+ ε, T ] .
(3.1)
We have the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Open-loop Nash equilibrium). An admissible strategy uˆ (·) ∈ L∞F (t, T ;R)×
M2F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy if
lim
ε↓0
inf
1
ε
{
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)}
≤ 0, (3.2)
for any t ∈ [0, T ] . The corresponding equilibrium wealth process solves the following SDE{
dXˆ (s) =
{
r0 (s) Xˆ (s) + uˆ (s)
⊤
B (s)
}
ds+ uˆ (s)⊤D (s) dW ⋆ (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
Xˆ (t) = ξ.
(3.3)
3.1 A necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls
In this paper we follow an alternative approach, which is essentially a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for equilibriums. In the same spirit of proving the stochastic Pontryagin’s
maximum principle for equilibriums in [12] for the case of linear quadratic models, we derive
this condition by a second-order expansion in the spike variation. We define what we mean
by an equilibrium rule, and then we derive a parabolic backward PDE. Our PDE is compa-
rable with the one obtained in [19] and [8], for some particular discount functions in finite
horizon with different utility functions. First, we introduce the adjoint equations involved
in the characterization of open-loop Nash equilibrium controls.
3.1.1 Adjoint processes
Let uˆ (·) =
(
cˆ (·) , uˆI (·)
⊤
)⊤
∈ L∞F (0, T ;R) × M
2
F
(
0, T ;Rd
)
an admissible strategy and
denote by Xˆ (·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R) the corresponding wealth process. For each t ∈ [0, T ], we
introduce the first order adjoint equation defined on the time interval [t, T ], and satisfied by
the pair of processes (p (·; t) , q (·; t)) as follows{
dp (s; t) = −r0 (s) p (s; t) ds+ q (s; t)
⊤
dW (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
p (T ; t) = λ (T − t) hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
,
(3.4)
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where q (·; t) = (q1 (·; t) , . . . , qd (·; t))
⊤
. Under the assumption (H1), the equation (3.4) is
uniquely solvable in L2F (t, T ;R)×M
2
F
(
0, T ;Rd
)
. Moreover there exists a constant K > 0
such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ] , we have the following estimate
‖p (·; t)‖2L2
F
(t,T ;R) + ‖q (·; t)‖
2
M2(t,T ;Rd) ≤ K
(
1 + ξ2
)
. (3.5)
The second order adjoint equation is defined on the time interval [t, T ] and satisfied by
the pair of processes (P (·; t) , Q (·; t)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R)×M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
as follows{
dP (s; t) = −2r0 (s)P (s; t) ds+Q (s; t)
⊤
dW (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
P (T ; t) = λ (T − t) hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
.
(3.6)
where Q (·; t) = (Q1 (·; t) , . . . , Qd (·; t))
⊤
. Under (H1) the above BSDE has a unique solution
(P (·; t) , Q (·; t)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R) ×M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
. Moreover we have the following represen-
tation for P (·; t)
P (s; t) = Es
[
λ (T − t) hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
e
∫ T
s
2r0(τ)dτ
]
, for s ∈ [t, T ] . (3.7)
Indeed, if we define the function Θ (s, ·) , for each s ∈ [0, T ] , as the fundamental solution
of the following linear ODE{
dΘ (s, τ) = r0 (τ) Θ (s, τ) dτ, for τ ∈ [s, T ] ,
Θ (s, s) = 1,
(3.8)
then, we apply the Itoˆ’s formula to τ → P (τ ; t) Θ (s, τ)2 on [s, T ] and by taking conditional
expectations we obtain (3.7). Note that since hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
≤ 0, then P (s; t) ≤ 0, ds− a.e.
3.1.2 A characterization of equilibrium strategies
The following theorem is the main result of this work, it provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for equilibriums. First, we define the process q˜ (s; t) =
(
0, q (s; t)⊤
)⊤
, and we
introduce the following notations
H (s; t) , p (s; t)B (s) +D (s) q˜ (s; t) + λ (s− t)ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
Γ, (3.9)
and
A (s; t) ,
(
λ (s− t)ϕcc
(
Γ⊤ (uˆ (s))
)
0⊤
Rn
0Rn σ (s)σ (s)
⊤
P (s; t)
)
. (3.10)
Theorem 3.2. Let (H1)-(H2) hold. Given an admissible strategy uˆ (.) ∈ L∞F (0, T ;R) ×
M2F
(
0, T ;Rd
)
, let for any t ∈ [0, T ] , (p (.; t) , q (.; t)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;R) ×M
2
F
(
t, T ;Rd
)
be the
unique solution to the BSDE (3.4). Then uˆ (·) is an equilibrium consumption-investment
strategy, if and only if, the following condition holds
H (t; t) = 0, dP−a.s., dt− a.e. (3.11)
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In order to derive the proof of this theorem, let us derive some technical results. First, de-
note by Xˆε (·) the solution of the state equation corresponding to uε (·). Since the coefficients
of the controlled state equation are linear, then by the standard perturbation approach, see
e.g. [29], we have
Xˆε (s)− Xˆ (s) = yε,v (s) + zε,v (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] , (3.12)
where for any Rd+1−valued, Ft−measurable and bounded random variable v and for any
ε ∈ [0, T − t) , yε,v (·) and zε,v (·) solve the following linear stochastic differential equations,
respectively{
dyε,v (s) = r0 (s) y
ε,v (s) ds+ v⊤D (s) 1[t,t+ε) (s) dW
⋆ (s) , for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
yε,v (t) = 0,
(3.13)
and {
dzε,v (s) =
{
r0 (s) z
ε,v (s) + v⊤B (s) 1[t,t+ε) (s)
}
ds, for s ∈ [t, T ] ,
zε,v (t) = 0.
(3.14)
Proposition 3.3. Let (H1) holds. For any t ∈ [0, T ] , the following estimates hold for any
k ≥ 1 :
E
t
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|yε,v (s)|2k
]
= O
(
εk
)
, (3.15)
E
t
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|zε,v (s)|2k
]
= O
(
ε2k
)
, (3.16)
E
t
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)|2k
]
= O
(
εk
)
. (3.17)
In addition, we have the following equality
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)
=
∫ t+ε
t
E
t
[
〈H (s; t) , v〉+
1
2
〈A (s; t) v, v〉
]
ds+ o (ε) . (3.18)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, we present the following technical lemma needed later in this study. It proof follows
an argument adapted from Hu el al. [13],
Lemma 3.4. Under assumptions (H1)-(H2). The following two statements are equivalent
i) lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [H (s; t)] ds = 0, dP− a.s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
ii) H (t; t) = 0, dP− a.s, dt− a.e.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Given an admissible strategy
uˆ (·) ∈ L∞F (0, T ;R)×M
2
F
(
0, T ;Rd
)
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for which (3.11) holds, according to Lemma 3.4 we have, for any t ∈ [0, T ] ,
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [H (s; t)] ds = 0.
Then from (3.18) , for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for any Rd+1−valued, Ft−measurable and
bounded random variable v
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)}
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
{〈
E
t [H (s; t)] , v
〉
ds+
1
2
〈
E
t [A (s; t)] v, v
〉}
ds,
=
1
2
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
〈
E
t [A (s; t)] v, v
〉
ds,
≤ 0,
where we have used in the last inequality the fact that, under the concavity condition of
ϕ (·) and h (·), it follows 〈A (s; t) v, v〉 ≤ 0. Hence uˆ (.) is an equilibrium strategy.
Conversely, assume that uˆ (·) is an equilibrium strategy. Then, by (3.2) together with
(3.18) , for any (t, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd+1 the following inequality holds:
lim
ε↓0
〈
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [H (s; t)] ds, u
〉
+
1
2
lim
ε↓0
〈
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [A (s; t)] ds u, u
〉
≤ 0. (3.19)
Now, we define ∀ (t, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd+1
Φ (t, u) = lim
ε↓0
1
ε
〈∫ t+ε
t
E
t [H (s; t)] ds, u
〉
+
1
2
lim
ε↓0
〈
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [A (s; t)] ds u, u
〉
.
Clearly Φ (., .) is well defined. Moreover, easy manipulations show that the inequality
(3.19) is equivalent to
Φ (t, 0) = max
u∈Rd+1
Φ (t, u) , dP− a.s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.20)
It is easy to see that the maximum condition (3.20) leads to the following condition,
∀t ∈ [0, T ]
Φu (t, 0) = lim
ε↓0
1
ε
∫ t+ε
t
E
t [H (s; t)] ds = 0, dP− a.s. (3.21)
According to Lemma 3.4, the expression (3.11) follows immediately. This completes the
proof.
4 Equilibrium when the coefficients are deterministic
Theorem 3.2. shows that one can obtain equilibrium consumption-investment strategies by
solving a system of FBSDEs which is not standard since the “flow” of the unknown process
(p (·; t) , q (·; t))t∈[0,T ] is involved. Moreover, there is an additional constraint that act on the
“diagonal” (i.e. when s = t) of the flow. As far as we know, the explicitly solvability of
this type of equations remains an open problem, even with a particular form of the utility
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functions. However, we are able to solve quite thoroughly this problem when the parameters
r (·) and σ (·) are deterministic functions.
In this section, let us look at the Merton’s portfolio problem with general discounting
and deterministic parameters. At first, we consider the following parabolic backward partial
differential equation
θt (t, x) + θx (t, x)
(
r0 (t) x− r (t)
⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
− I (λ (T − t) θ (t, x))
)
+
1
2
θxx (t, x) r (t)
⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
(
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
)2
+ θ (t, x) r0 (t) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
θ (T, x) = hx (x) ,
(4.1)
where we shall denote by I (.) the (continuous, strictly decreasing) inverse function of the
marginal derivative utility ϕc (.) and Σ (s) ≡
(
σ (s) σ (s)⊤
)−1
.
We have the following verification theorem
Theorem 4.1. Let (H1)-(H2) hold. If there exists a classical solution
θ (·, ·) ∈ C1,2 ((0, T )× R,R) ∩ C ([0, T ]× R,R)
of the PDE (4.1) such that the stochastic differential equation
dXˆ (s) =
r0 (s) Xˆ (s)− r (s)⊤ Σ (s) r (s) θ
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
θx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
) − I (λ (T − s) θ (s, Xˆ (s)))
 ds
−
θ
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
θx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)r (s)⊤ Σ (s)σ (s) dW (s) , s ∈ [0, T ] ,
Xˆ (0) = x0,
(4.2)
has a unique solution Xˆ (·) , then the equilibrium consumption-investment strategy uˆ (·) =(
cˆ (·) , uˆI (·)
⊤
)⊤
is given by
cˆ (t) = I
(
λ (T − t) θ
(
t, Xˆ (t)
))
, dt− a.e., (4.3)
uˆI (t) = −Σ (t) r (t)
θ
(
t, Xˆ (t)
)
θx
(
t, Xˆ (t)
) , dt− a.e. (4.4)
Proof. Suppose that uˆ (·) =
(
cˆ (·) , uˆI (·)
⊤
)⊤
is an equilibrium control and denote by
Xˆ (·) the corresponding wealth process. Then in view of Theorem 3.2 there exist an adapted
process
(
Xˆ (·) , (p (·; t) , q (·; t))t∈[0,T ]
)
solution to the following flow of forward-backward
SDEs, parametrized by t ∈ [0, T ]
dX (s) =
{
r0 (s) Xˆ (s) + uˆI (s)
⊤
r (s)− cˆ (s)
}
ds+ uˆI (s)
⊤
σ (s) dW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
dp (s; t) = −r0 (s) p (s; t) ds+ q (s, t)
⊤
dW (s) , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T,
Xˆ (0) = x0, p (T ; t) = λ (T − t) hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
, t ∈ [0, T ] ,
(4.5)
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whith conditions
− p (t; t) + ϕc (cˆ (t)) = 0, dt− a.e., (4.6)
p (t; t) r (t) + σ (t) q (t; t) = 0, dt− a.e. (4.7)
From the terminal condition in the first order adjoint process we consider the following
Ansatz
p (s; t) = λ (T − t)V
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
, ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, (4.8)
for some deterministic function V (., .) ∈ C1,2 ([0, T ]× R,R) such that V (T, .) = hx (.) .
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.8), it yields
dp (s; t) = λ (T − t)
{
Vs
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
+ Vx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)(
Xˆ (s) r0 (s) + uˆI (s)
⊤
r (s)− cˆ (s)
)
+
1
2
Vxx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
uˆI (s)
⊤
σ (s)σ (s)⊤ uˆI (s)
}
ds
+ λ (T − t)Vx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
uˆI (s)
⊤
σ (s) dW (s) . (4.9)
Next, comparing the ds term in (4.9) by the ones in the second equation in (4.5) , we
deduce that
Vs
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
+ Vx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)(
Xˆ (s) r0 (s) + uˆI (s)
⊤
r (s)− cˆ (s)
)
+
1
2
Vxx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
uˆI (s)
⊤
σ (s)σ (s)⊤ uˆI (s) = −r0 (s)V
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
, (4.10)
and by comparing the dW (s) terms we also get
q (s, t) = λ (T − t)Vx
(
s, Xˆ (s)
)
σ (s)⊤ uˆI (s) . (4.11)
We put the above expressions of p (s; t) and q (s; t) at s = t into (4.6) and (4.7) , then
λ (T − t)V
(
t, Xˆ (t)
)
− ϕc (cˆ (t)) = 0, (4.12)
and
Vx
(
t, Xˆ (t)
)
σ (t)σ (t)⊤ uˆI (t) = −r (t)V
(
t, Xˆ (t)
)
, (4.13)
which leads to the following representation
cˆ (t) = I
(
λ (T − t)V
(
t, Xˆ (t)
))
, dt− a.e., (4.14)
uˆI (t) = −Σ (t) r (t)
V
(
t, Xˆ (t)
)
Vx
(
t, Xˆ (t)
) , dt− a.e. (4.15)
Then by taking expressions (4.14) and (4.15) into (4.10), this suggests that V (., .) coin-
cides with the solution of the PDE (4.1), evaluated along the trajectory Xˆ (t) , solution of
the state equation.
Remark 4.2. Equation (4.1) is comparable with the one in Mar´ın-Solano & Navas [19] and
Ekland & Pirvu [8], in which the equilibrium is defined within the class of feedback controls.
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5 Special utility functions
Equilibrium investment-consumption strategies for Merton’s portfolio problem with general
discounting and deterministic parameters have been studied in [19], [8] and [28] among others
in different frameworks. In this section, we discuss some special cases in which the function
θ (., .) may be separated into functions of time and state variables. Then, one needs only to
solve a system of ODEs in order to completely determine the equilibrium strategies. We will
compare our results with some existing ones in literature.
5.1 Potential utility function
To make the problem (2.8) − (2.9) explicitly solvable, we consider power utility functions
for the running and terminal costs. That is, ϕ (c) =
cγ
γ
and h (x) = a
xγ
γ
, with a > 0 and
γ ∈ (0, 1) . In this case the PDE (4.1) reduces to
θt (t, x) + θx (t, x)
(
r0 (t)x− r (t)
⊤Σ (t) r (t)
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
−
λ (T − t)1−γ
θ (t, x)γ−1
)
+
1
2
θxx (t, x) r (t)
⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
(
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
)2
+ r0 (t) θ (t, x) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
θ (T, x) = axγ−1.
From the terminal condition, we consider the following trial solution
θ (s, x) = aΠ (s) xγ−1,
for some deterministic function Π (.) ∈ C1 ([0, T ] ,R) with the terminal condition Π (T ) = 1.
Then by substituting in (4.1) , we obtain{
Πt (t) +
(
K (t) +Q (t) Π (t)
1
γ−1
)
Π (t) = 0, for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
Π (T ) = 1.
(5.1)
where
K (t) ≡ γr0 (t) +
1
2
γ
(1− γ)
r (t)⊤ Σ (t) r (t) , (5.2)
and
Q (t) ≡ (1− γ) (aλ (T − t))
1
γ−1 . (5.3)
It remains to determine the function Π (.) , First, by the change of variable
Π (t) = y (t)(1−γ) , for t ∈ [0, T ] , (5.4)
we find that y (.) should solve the following ODE yt (t)−
K (t)
(γ − 1)
y (t)−
Q (t)
(γ − 1)
= 0, for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
y (T ) = 1.
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A variation of constant formula yields
y (t) =
1− ∫ T
t
Q (τ)
(γ − 1)
e
∫ T
τ
K (l)
(γ − 1)
dl
dτ
 exp(−∫ T
t
K (τ)
(γ − 1)
dτ
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
subsequently we obtain
Π (t) =
1− ∫ T
t
Q (τ)
(γ − 1)
e
∫ T
τ
K (l)
(γ − 1)
dl
dτ

1−γ
exp
(∫ T
t
K (τ) dτ
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4)
give
cˆ (t) = (aλ (T − t) Π (t))
1
γ−1 Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (5.5)
uˆI (t) = Σ (t) r (t)
Xˆ (t)
(1− γ)
, dt− a.e. (5.6)
which is comparable with the ones obtained by Mar´ın-Solano & Navas [19], Ekland & Pirvu
[8] and Yong [28].
5.2 Logarithmic utility function
Now, let us analyse the case where ϕ (c) = ln (c) , and h (x) = a ln (x) , with a > 0. In this
case the PDE (4.1) reduces to
θt (t, x) + θx (t, x)
(
r0 (t) x− r (t)
⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
− (λ (T − t) θ (t, x))−1
)
+
1
2
θxx (t, x) r (t)
⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
(
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
)2
+ r0 (t) θ (t, x) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
θ (T, x) =
a
x
.
(5.7)
Once again, we know that the solution of (5.7) will be of the form
θ (t, x) = ϕ (t)
a
x
, for t ∈ [0, T ] , (5.8)
where, ϕ (.) ∈ C1 ([0, T ] ,R) . By substituting in (5.7) , we get ϕt (t) +
1
aλ (T − t)
= 0, for t ∈ [0, T ] ,
ϕ (T ) = 1,
(5.9)
which is explicitely solved by
ϕ (t) = 1 +
∫ T
t
1
aλ (T − r)
dr, for t ∈ [0, T ] .
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In view of Theorem 4.1, the representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4)
then give
cˆ (t) =
(
aλ (T − t) +
∫ T
t
λ (T − t)
λ (T − r)
dr
)−1
Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (5.10)
uˆI (t) = Σ (t) r (t) Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e. (5.11)
5.3 Exponential utility function
Next, we consider the case where ϕ (c) = −
e−γc
γ
and h (x) = −a
e−γx
γ
, with a, γ > 0. The
terminal condition PDE (4.1) becomes
θt (t, x) + θx (t, x)
(
r0 (t) x− r (t)
⊤Σ (t) r (t)
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
−
1
γ
ln (λ (T − t) θ (t, x))
)
+
1
2
θxx (t, x) r (t)
⊤Σ (t) r (t)
(
θ (t, x)
θx (t, x)
)2
+ r0 (t) θ (t, x) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
θ (T, x) = ae−γx.
(5.12)
We try a solution of the form
θ (t, x) = ae−γ(φ(t)x+ψ(t)), for t ∈ [0, T ] , (5.13)
where φ (.), ψ (.) ∈ C1 ([0, T ] ,R) such that φ (T ) = 1, ψ (T ) = 0. By substituting in (5.12)
we get {
−γφt (t) + γφ (t)
2 − γφ (t) r0 (t)
}
x−
1
2
r (t)⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
−γψt (t)− φ (t) ln (aλ (T − t)) + γφ (t)ψ (t) + r0 (t) = 0.
This suggests that functions φ (.) and ψ (.) should solve the following system of equations
φt (t) = −r0 (t)φ (t) + φ (t)
2
, t ∈ [0, T ] ,
ψt (t) = −
1
γ
φ (t) ln (aλ (T − t)) + φ (t)ψ (t)−
1
2γ
r (t)⊤Σ (t) r (t) +
1
γ
r0 (t) , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
φ (T ) = 1, ψ (T ) = 0,
(5.14)
which is explicitly solvable for t ∈ [0, T ] , by
φ (t) =
e
∫ T
t
r0(τ)dτ
1 +
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
l
r0(τ)dτdl
, (5.15)
and
ψ (t) = e−
∫ T
t
φ(τ)dτ
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
l
φ(τ)dτ
(
1
γ
φ (l) ln (λ (T − l) a) +
1
2γ
r (t)⊤Σ (t) r (t)−
r0 (l)
γ
)
dt.
(5.16)
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The representation of the Nash equilibrium strategies (4.3)-(4.4) give
cˆ (t) = −
1
γ
ln (aλ (T − t)) + φ (t) Xˆ (t) + ψ (t) , dt− a.e. (5.17)
uˆI (t) =
1
γ
Σ (t) r (t)φ (t)−1 , dt− a.e. (5.18)
The above solutions is comparable with the ones obtained in Mar´ın-Solano & Navas [19]
by solving an extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations.
6 Special discount function
As well documented in [19], an agent making a decision at time t is usually called the
t-agent, and can act in two different ways: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents take
decisions without taking into account that their preferences will change in the near future,
and then any t-agent will solve the problem as a standard optimal control problem with
initial condition X(t) = xt and his decision will be in general time-inconsistent. In order to
obtain a time consistent strategy, the t-agent should be sophisticated, in the sense of taking
into account the preferences of all the s-agents, for s ∈ [t, T ]. Therefore, the approach
to handle the time inconsistency in dynamic decision making problems is by considering
time-inconsistent problems as non-cooperative games with a continuous number of players,
in which decisions at every instant of time are selected. The solution to the problem of
the agent with non-constant discounting should be constructed by looking for the subgame
perfect equilibria of the associated game with an infinite number of t-agents. In [19] the
authors looked for a solution of a sophisticated agent to the modified HJB (which is not a
partial differential equation due to the presence of a non-local term). Then, they need to
define the Markov equilibrium strategies, while in our work and different from [19], we use
the open-loop equilibrium strategies, this is a significant difference which leads to obtain an
important change in the results.
6.1 Exponential discounting with constant discont rate (Classical
model)
At first, we consider the standard exponential discount function λ (t) = e−δ0t, t ∈ [0, T ],
where δ0 > 0 is a constant representing the discount rate. In this case, our equilibrium
solution for the three cases become
1) Logarithmic utility
cˆ(t)=
1
ae−(T−t)δ0 +
∫ T
s
e−(l−t)δ0dl
Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e.,
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t) Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e.
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2) Potential utility
cˆ (t) =
(
ae−(T−t)δ0
) 1
γ−1
e
∫ T
t
K (τ)
γ − 1
dτ1 + ∫ Tt (ae−(T−τ)δ0) 1γ−1 e
∫ T
τ
K (l)
γ − 1
dl
dτ

Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e.,
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t)
Xˆ (t)
(1− γ)
, dt− a.e.
3) Exponential utility
cˆ (t) =−
1
γ
ln
(
ae−(T−t)δ0
)
+ φ (t) Xˆ (t) + ψ (t) , dt− a.e.,
uˆI (t) = Σ (t) r (t)
1
γφ (t)
, dt− a.e.
where K (·) , φ (·) are given by (5.2) and (5.15) , respectively, and
ψ (t) =
1
γ
e−
∫ T
t
φ(τ)dτ
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
l
φ(τ)dτ
(
φ (l) ln
(
e−(T−l)δ0a
)
+
1
2
r (l)⊤ Σ (l) r (l)− r0 (l)
)
dl.
Notice that our solutions given above coincide with the optimal solutions of classical
Merton portfolio problem (see e.g. [19] in the case with constant discount rate). This
confirms the well-known fact that the time-consistent equilibrium strategy for an exponential
discount function is nothing but the optimal strategy. A relevant remark is that the portfolio
rule is independent of the discount factor, and it is the same for the non-exponential discount
function.
6.2 Exponential discounting with non constant discount rate
(Karp’s model)
Now, following Karp [15], let us assume that the instantaneous discount rate is non-constant,
but a function of time δ (l), for l ∈ [0, T ]. Impatient agents will be characterized by a non-
increasing discount rate δ (·). The discount factor used to evaluate a payoff at times τ ≥ 0,
is given by
λ (τ) = e−
∫ τ
0
δ(l)dl. (6.1)
In this case the objective is exactly the same as Mar´ın-Solano and Navas [19], in which the
equilibrium is however defined within the class of feedback controls. In [19], the (feedback)
equilibrium consumption-investment solutions (also called the sophisticated consumption-
investment strategies) are summarized as
1) Logarithmic utility
cˆ (t) =
1
ae−
∫ T−t
0
δ(τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s−l
0
δ(τ)dτdl
Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (6.2)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t) Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e. (6.3)
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2) Potential utility
cˆ (t) = (α (t))
1
γ−1 Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (6.4)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t)
Xˆ (t)
(1− γ)
, dt− a.e. (6.5)
where α (.) is the solution to the integro-differential equation,
αt (t)− (δ (T − t)−K (t))α (t) + (1− γ)α (t)
γ
1−γ
−
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s−t
0
δ(l)dl (δ (s− t)− δ (T − t))α (s)
γ
1−γ eγ
∫ s
t
∆(τ)dτds = 0,
α (T ) = a.
(6.6)
with K (t) given by (5.2) and
∆ (τ) = r0 (τ) +
1
(1− γ)
r (τ)⊤Σ (τ) r (τ)− α (τ)
1
1−γ .
3) Exponential utility
cˆ (t) = φ (t) Xˆ (t) + C (t)−
ln (γaφ (t))
γ
, dt− a.e., (6.7)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t)
1
γφ (t)
, dt− a.e. (6.8)
where φ (·) is given by (5.15) and C (·) satisfies the following very complicated integro-
differential equation,
Ct (t)− C (t)φ (t) +
1
γ
φ (t) ln (aγφ (t)) +
1
2γ
r (t)⊤ Σ (t) r (t)
+
1
γ
{δ (T − t)− φ (t)−K (C (t) , t)} = 0,
C (T ) = 0,
(6.9)
where
K (C (t) , t) = −E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s−t
0
δ(l)dl {δ (s− t)− δ (T − t)}φ (t)
× e−γ{C(s)−C(t)+
∫ s
t
φ(τ)Z(τ)dτ+
∫ s
t
1
γ
r(τ)⊤Σ(τ)σ(τ)dW (τ)}ds
]
, (6.10)
with
Z (τ) =
1
γφ (τ)
r (τ)⊤ Σ (τ) r (τ)− C (τ) +
1
γ
ln (γaφ (τ)) .
Our (open-loop) equilibrium solutions reduce to
1) Logarithmic utility
cˆ (t) =
1
ae−
∫ T−t
0
δ(τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
e−
∫ T−s
T−l
δ(τ)dτdl
Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (6.11)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t) Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e. (6.12)
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2) Potential utility
cˆ (t) =
(
ae−
∫ T−t
0
δ(τ)dτ
) 1
γ−1
e
∫ T
s
K (τ)
γ − 1
dτ
1 + ∫ Tt (ae− ∫ T−τ0 δ(τ)dτ) 1γ−1 e
∫ T
τ
K (l)
γ − 1
dl
dτ

Xˆ (t) , dt− a.e., (6.13)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t)
Xˆ (t)
(1− γ)
, dt− a.e. (6.14)
3) Exponential utility
cˆ (t) = −
1
γ
ln
(
ae−
∫ T−t
0
δ(τ)dτ
)
+ φ (t) Xˆ (t) + ψ (t) , dt− a.e., (6.15)
uˆI(t) = Σ (t) r (t)
1
γXˆ (t)φ (t)
, dt− a.e. (6.16)
where K (·) , φ (·) are given by (5.2) and (5.15) , respectively, and
ψ (t) = e−
∫ T
t
φ(τ)dτ
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
l
φ(τ)dτ
(
1
γ
φ (l) ln
(
e−
∫ T−t
0
δ(τ)dτa
)
+
1
2γ
r (l)⊤Σ (l) r (l)−
r0 (l)
γ
)
dl.
Remark 6.1. Comparing the results of this special case with our solutions, we find the
following facts: The equlibrium proportion investment strategies coincide in the three cases.
The consumption strategies are different in the three cases. Moreover, our equilibrium
consumption strategies are well defined and explicitly given, while in [19] the equilibrium
consumption strategy in the case of Potential utility as well as the case of Exponential utility
are obtained via a very complicated integro-differential equations, whose unique solvability
are not established.
7 Appendix
Following Hu e al. [12], we derive the proof of Proposition 3.3 by means of the duality
analysis. Moreover, since our objctive function is not in quadratic form, we need to adapt
the results obtained in [12] according to our control problem which concerns a non-quadratic
utility maximization.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The estimates (3.15)− (3.17) follow from the Theorem 4.4
in [29]. Moreover the following expansion holds for the objective functional
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)
= Et
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)
(
ϕ
(
Γ⊤uε (s)
)
− ϕ
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
))
ds+ λ (T − t)
(
h (Xε (T ))− h
(
Xˆ (T )
))]
(A.1.1)
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Now, applying the second order Taylor-Lagrange expansion to ϕ
(
Γ⊤uε (s)
)
− ϕ
(
Γ⊤u (s)
)
,
we find
ϕ
(
Γ⊤uε (s)
)
− ϕ
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
= ϕ
(
Γ⊤
(
uˆ (s) + v1[t,t+ε)
))
− ϕ
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
,
=
{〈
ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
Γ, v
〉
+
1
2
〈
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤
(
uˆ (s) + θv1[t,t+ε)
))
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉}
1[t,t+ε).
=
〈
ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
Γ, v
〉
1[t,t+ε) +
1
2
〈
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉
1[t,t+ε)
+
1
2
{〈(
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤
(
uˆ (s) + θv1[t,t+ε)
))
− ϕcc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
))
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉}
1[t,t+ε). (A.1.2)
Notice that
E
t
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)
{〈(
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤
(
uˆ (s) + θv1[t,t+ε)
))
− ϕcc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
))
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉}
1[t,t+ε)ds
]
≤ C ‖v‖2 Et
[(∫ T
t
θ
∣∣v1[t,t+ε)∣∣ ds)2
] 1
2
E
t
[(∫ T
t
1[t,t+ε)ds
)2] 12
= Cθ ‖v‖3 ε2 = o (ε) ,
where ‖v‖ denote the Euclidean norm of v, that is ‖v‖2 =: 〈v, v〉 . Then we obtain
E
t
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)
(
ϕ
(
Γ⊤uε (s)
)
− ϕ
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
))
ds
]
= Et
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)
{〈
ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
Γ, v
〉
+
1
2
〈
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉}
1[t,t+ε)
]
+ o (ε) .
Noting that, by the second order Taylor-Lagrange expanssion, see e.g. [29], we have for
some constant L > 0,
E
t
[
h
(
Xˆ (T ) + yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )
)
− h
(
Xˆ (T )
)]
= Et
[
hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T )) +
1
2
hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T ))2
]
+ o (ε) ,
then the following expansion holds for the objective functional
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)
(A.1.3)
= Et
[∫ T
t
λ (s− t)
{〈
ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
Γ, v
〉
+
1
2
〈
ϕcc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
ΓΓ⊤v, v
〉}
1[t,t+ε)ds
+ λ (T − t)
(
hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +
1
2
hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))2
)]
+ o (ε) .
Notice that
λ (T − t)
(
hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +
1
2
hxx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))2
)
= p (T ; t) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) +
1
2
P (s; t) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))2 .
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Now, by applying Ito’s formula to s 7→ p (s; t) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s)) on [t, T ], we get
E
t [p (T ; t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T ))] = Et
[∫ t+ε
t
{
v⊤B (s) p (s; t) + v⊤D (s) q˜ (s; t)
}
ds
]
. (A.1.4)
Again, by applying Ito’s formula to s 7→ P (s; t) (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))2 on [t, T ] , we get
E
t
[
P (T ; t) (yε,v (T ) + zε,v (T ))2
]
= Et
[∫ t+ε
t
{
2v⊤ (yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
(
B (s)P (s, t) +D (s) Q˜ (s, t)
)
+v⊤
(
D (s)D (s)⊤
)
vP (s, t)
}
ds
]
,
(A.1.5)
where Q˜ (s; t) =
(
0, Q (s; t)⊤
)⊤
. In the other hand, we conclude from (H1) together with
(3.17) that
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
(yε,v (s) + zε,v (s))
(
B (s)P (s, t) +D (s) Q˜ (s, t)
)
ds
]
= o (ε) . (A.1.6)
By taking (A.1.4) , (A.1.5) and (A.1.6) in (A.1.3) , it follows that
J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uε (·)
)
− J
(
t, Xˆ (t) , uˆ (·)
)
= Et
[∫ t+ε
t
{〈
B (s) p (s; t) +D (s) q˜ (s; t) + λ (s− t)ϕc
(
Γ⊤uˆ (s)
)
1[t,t+ε)Γ, v
〉
+
1
2
〈(
ϕcc (〈Γ,uˆ (s)〉) ΓΓ
⊤ + P (s, t)D (s)D (s)⊤
)
v, v
〉}
ds
]
+ o (ε) ,
which is equivalent to (3.18) .
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We set up α (s) = e
∫ T
s
−r0(τ)dτ . Now, we define for t ∈ [0, T ] and
s ∈ [t, T ]
(p¯ (s; t) , q¯ (s; t)) ≡
α (s)
λ (T − t)
(p (s; t) , q (s; t)) .
Then for any t ∈ [0, T ] , in the interval [t, T ] , the pair (p¯ (.; t) , q¯ (.; t)) satisfies{
dp¯ (s; t) = q¯ (s; t)⊤ dW (s) , s ∈ [t, T ] ,
p¯ (T ; t) = hx
(
Xˆ (T )
)
,
(A.2.1)
Moreover, it is clear that from the uniqueness of solutions to (A.2.1), we have the equality
(p¯ (s; t1) , q¯ (s; t1)) = (p¯ (s; t2) , q¯ (s; t2)) , for any t1, t2, s ∈ [0, T ] such that 0 < t1 < t2 < s <
T. Hence, the solution (p¯ (·; t) , q¯ (·; t)) does not depend on the variable t and this allows us
to denote the solution of (A.2.1) by (p¯ (·) , q¯ (·)) .
We have then, for any t ∈ [0, T ] , and s ∈ [t, T ] ,
(p (s; t) , q (s; t)) = λ (T − t)α (s)−1 (p¯ (s) , q¯ (s)) . (A.2.2)
Now using (A.2.2) we have, under (H2), for any t ∈ [0, T ] and s ∈ [t, T ] ,
|p (s; t)− p (s; s)| =
∣∣(λ (T − t)− λ (T − s))α (s)−1 p¯ (s)∣∣
≤ |s− t|
∣∣α (s)−1 p¯ (s)∣∣ , (A.2.3)
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and
|q (s; t)− q (s; s)| ≤ |s− t|
∣∣α (s)−1 q¯ (s)∣∣ . (A.2.4)
From which, we have for any t ∈ [0, T ] ,
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
|H (s; t)−H (s; s)| ds
]
≤ Clim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
|s− t|
∣∣p¯ (s) + q¯ (s) + Γ⊤ϕc (Γ⊤uˆ (s))∣∣ ds] ,
≤ Clim
ε↓0
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
∣∣p¯ (s) + q¯ (s) + Γ⊤ϕc (Γ⊤uˆ (s))∣∣ ds] ,
= 0.
Thus
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
H (s; t) ds
]
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
H (s; s) ds
]
. (A.2.5)
From the above equality, it is clear that if ii) holds, then
lim
ε↓0
1
ε
E
t
[∫ t+ε
t
H (s; t) ds
]
= 0. dP− a.s,
Conversely, according to Lemma 3.4 in [13], if i) holds then
H (s; s) = 0, dP− a.s, ds− a.e.
This completes the proof.
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